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Towards a Political Economy of Takings
Jeffry A. Frieden*
I am a complete outsider to the enormous and excellent literature
on takings, and my only qualification to consider it is my
consanguinity with a leading contributor to this body of knowledge.
In this article, I offer the musings of one whose own work is of
political economy and an area of political economy far removed from
the issues typically raised by takings.1
To a neophyte, the most striking characteristic of takings is the
privileged position accorded landed property. Although I have had
great difficulty finding detailed information, it appears that every
law-governed society, including the centrally planned economies
before their demise, treats governmental policies that involve the
physical taking of land very differently from policies that affect other
assets.2
In this article, I address why land is different. First, I consider
some potential answers to this puzzle. Most have merit, but none
explain why land is treated so distinctly from other assets. Every
purported explanation for the differential treatment of land should
also apply to some other class of assets, but they do not.
Next, I conjecture about the reasons for the privileged status of
land, emphasizing the role of politicians. I argue that policymakers
have strong reasons to delegate decisions regarding the taking of land
to other agencies, reasons that grow out of the extreme specificity of
land as an asset. Given this specificity, the taking of land gives rise to
extremely thorny valuation problems, as well as to very strong
* Department of Government, Harvard University. The author acknowledges, without
implicating, extremely useful comments and suggestions from James Alt, Rachelle Alterman,
Benjamin Davy, Dhammika Dharmapala, William Fischel, Michael Levine, Daniel Mandelker,
Mark Ramseyer, Kenneth Shepsle, and Dan Tarlock.
1. I am Daniel Mandelker’s nephew and my work is on the political economy of
international monetary and financial relations.
2. For a useful if somewhat dated treatment of this topic, see U.K. NATIONAL
COMMISSION OF COMPARATIVE LAW, COMPENSATION FOR COMPULSORY PURCHASE (John
Francis Garner ed., 1975).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p137+Frieden.doc 01/04/01
138 Festschrift [Vol. 3:137
incentives for the exertion of political pressure. It is politically
efficient for policymakers to delegate the problem to an
administrative body that is better insulated from lobbying. While
there are similar incentives in other policy realms, they are nowhere
as strong as with land.
I. THE PUZZLE AND SOME POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS
In the United States and elsewhere, governments compensate
landowners with the “fair” value of property that is taken in pursuit of
a public purpose. Although this may seem uncontroversial and
unproblematic, there is no reason why it should be the case, or why it
should only be the case for land. Government policies affect the value
of many private assets, and it is not uncommon for government
policies to make some private assets worthless. The removal of trade
protection can turn a factory into scrap and make employees’ human
capital useless, at least in the employees’ current location. Changes in
regulations can make financial institutions unviable. Inflation or
devaluation reduce (although they usually do not destroy) the real
value of nominal assets, including government bonds and private
contracts.3
One common explanation as to why land is treated differently is
the uncertainty of being compensated for improved property.4 If a
piece of land could be taken without “fair” compensation, its owner
would have little motive to invest in improvements. However, this is
simply one of many conceivable examples of time inconsistency in
3. Penetrating explorations of these issues, which have helped me to clarify my
understanding of current scholarship, include RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Takings, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 561-69 (1998); WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995); William A.
Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from the Military Draft for the
Takings Issue, 20 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 24, 24-63 (Fall 1996). Another way of posing the
question, as Epstein suggests, is to ask why owners are not similarly compensated for other
(non-takings) governmental policies that affect the value of assets. Epstein. More finely, we
might ask why “physical invasions” are treated differently than regulations that may have equal
or greater effects on asset values.
4. See Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1315-1400 (1993)
(developing this and related points). See Lawrence Blume & Daniel Rubenfield, Compensation
for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984).
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policy, the fact that governments have incentives to renege on prior
promises— such as a promise to subsidize an industry, provide price
stability, or service government debt.5 Generations of political
economists have analyzed this class of problems and have shown
how governments can attempt to mitigate them with devices to
improve their ability to keep their promises. Such “commitment
technologies” are not perfect, but they can reduce the difficulty
inherent in the many policy areas beset by time inconsistency.
Perhaps the best-known argument has been made with regard to
monetary policy. It is often argued that the establishment of an
independent central bank can mitigate government’s temptations to
inflate. The broader point is that the incentive problems associated
with potential governmental takings of land are no different than
those that confront a very wide variety of other assets. Yet, the
solution to such problems, a promise to compensate for the
government’s physical impairment of landed property, is found
almost nowhere else. We can generalize from this to all arguments
based on economic efficiency: inasmuch as they should apply to a
wide variety of assets, they cannot explain the privileged position of
land.
Another common explanation for the protection of landed
property is tradition. During the early transition from feudalism to
capitalism, powerful local nobles extracted royal promises to respect
their property, which was primarily land. This commitment was
enshrined in formal and informal constitutions, and has remained in
place.6 This sort of path-dependent argument cannot be refuted
directly, for one can always find a point at which governments agree
to treat property differently-every such policy must have a beginning.
The royal-noble story does not explain why similar commitments are
just as common in countries without a real feudal past as they are
elsewhere. Nor does it explain why the norms are as strong as, or
stronger, in countries that violently overthrew monarchical rule, such
as in the New World, as they are in former or continuing monarchies.
5. See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1977) (providing the classic statement).
6. The argument reminds one of the old British music-hall line, “Does the name Magna
Carta mean nothing to you? Did she die in vain?”
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The path-dependent approach also does not explain why the former
centrally planned economies had a different set of policies for
property in land than for all other forms of private property.
Therefore, whatever merit there may be in these explanations, they do
not directly address the problem that interests me: why land is treated
differently from other assets in every law-governed society.
II. A POLITICAL ECONOMY CONJECTURE
The secret of the distinctive treatment of land must reside in one
or more of its characteristics as an asset. I suggest that the crucial
characteristic may be the extremely high level of specificity of landed
assets. In this setting, the specificity of an asset refers to the
difference between the value of the asset in its current use and its
value in its best alternative use. The concept is central to modern
analyses of industrial organization, contractual relationships, and
other contexts in which it is common to find non-market exchanges.
Indeed, the point of departure in influential literature on transactions
costs is asset specificity, which makes arms-length market-based
interactions difficult if not impossible.7
The specificity of an asset to a particular use creates two
interrelated problems: valuation and opportunism. It is extremely
difficult to put a market value on an asset when the asset’s value is
highly dependent on context. For example, it is hard to imagine how
to determine the value of a one-of-a-kind machine that is essential to
producing Ford Escorts, but useless in any other role. By the same
token, the owner or producer of such a machine would be able to
“hold up” Ford opportunistically for more money (and Ford could do
the same to the owner or producer) assuming no substitutes were
available. As a result, no feasible contract could be written to
overcome all of the problems associated with the great specificity of
this asset. The difficulties inherent in such circumstances explain why
7. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975) (providing
the canonical starting points). See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); WILLIAM BAUMOL ET
AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982) (noting that
asset specificity is related (and opposite) to the idea of the “contestability” of markets).
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firms internalize many parts of the production process, that is, they
do not carry them out on the open market. Similar circumstances are
often presented as the reason for the organization of many political
“exchanges.”8
Although some land is undifferentiated and standardized, the
value of most land is highly specific to its location, owner, and its
current use. The owner of a parcel of land usually has accumulated it
in its present form for a reason–it can be cropped in line with the
family’s resources, it can be divided for inheritance, or it makes
aesthetic or economic sense. The location of the property itself is
often of value (as in the standard broker’s line about the three
important factors in determining property value: location, location,
and location) whether for reasons of sentiment or tradition, or
because of intangible local externalities such as family and friends. In
addition, improvements are often custom-built and may be difficult to
replicate or disaggregate. Thus, losing some or all of a plot of land
often involves damages that cannot be repaired, as centuries of
literary encomiums to lost homesteads and places attest.
Without going into more depth, to add the requisite cautionary
notes,9 let me simply posit that land is unusually specific as an
asset.10 The next step is recognizing that there are circumstances
when public purpose requires that privately owned land be taken or
otherwise physically invaded. This is precisely due to specificity.
Some lands are close to essential for the provision of legitimate
public goods, including passage for roads or rivers, flood control,
construction of public amenities.
Of course, provision of public goods can involve government
policies that reduce or eliminate the value of private assets other than
8. For a good survey, see AVINASH DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A
TRANSACTION-COST POLITICS PERSPECTIVE (1996).
9. These include the fact that specificity is on a continuum; that some lands are more
specific than other lands, some not at all; that entire professions are based on coming up with
pecuniary equivalents for assets that are difficult to value, such as good will; that land may be
extreme in its specificity but is by no means unique; and that we expect individuals and
societies to adjust in ways that mitigate the costs of this specificity. However, I believe that the
general point holds: land is generally highly specific as to its site, use, and improvement.
10. Both Dan Tarlock and Michael Levine have pointed out to me that this is indicated by
the common-law doctrine that land is unique, as reflected in the use of forced transfer (“specific
performance”) rather than money damages as a remedy.
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land. A provision of public education or transportation has an impact
on private schools and transport companies, even when the
government does not simply take over private firms. Here, too,
valuation problems can be very difficult. Whether or not their taking
is for public purposes that would be widely recognized as desirable,
many private firms have been nationalized by governments around
the world. Two points are worth making in this regard. First, the
taking of land is far more common than the taking of other assets.
Second, the validity of the argument made here should apply to other
assets in proportion to their specificity: the more specific the asset, all
else being equal, the more its treatment will be like that of land. But
let me first develop the argument with regard to land.
The great specificity of landed property leads to two predictable
responses to a taking. The first is that the value of the property may
be hotly contested. The value of a piece of property as a private
homestead or part of a farm may be very different from its value as
roadbed for a railroad. Even if the full impact of the parcel’s
contribution to society as a railroad could be measured and all
externalities thus internalized, the property may have intangible
components of significance to its owner that complicate the
calculation of the appropriate Pareto-improving compensation. As
long experience demonstrates, it is easy to predict the price to be paid
for taken property will be particularly controversial. This is not just
because owners always believe that “fair” compensation involves
more money, but also because the actual value of the property to the
owner may be impossible to measure, thus leaving “fairness”
impossible to assess. 11
The second implication of great asset specificity, in land as
elsewhere, is that it increases the incentive to engage in political
action to affect outcomes. This can be seen in two closely related
ways. First, the more specific an asset is, the greater the quasi-rents
associated with its use, making the asset more valuable to its owner.
This in and of itself would, all else being equal, increase the owner’s
11. Indeed, and in line with my discussion here, because it is so difficult to calculate the
value of land to its owner, Pareto improvements may not in fact be attainable. It is theoretically
possible that the difference between the market value of the land and its value to its current
owner is larger than the welfare improvements that would result from the taking.
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incentive to protect the asset. Second, asset specificity usually means
that “sunk costs are not sunk,” so that it is rational for owners to take
into account their current holdings to determine future actions. This is
because the value of assets is interdependent: losing a plot of land
may reduce the value of a farmer’s other land or buildings. This
further heightens the incentive to resist the loss and increases the
value of the property to the owner (but not the taker).12
Asset specificity gives rise to conflicting incentives for
policymakers. On the one hand, policy can be tailored to please
constituents by providing (or protecting) rents accruing to such
assets. Precisely because the policy decision can be extremely
favorable to the private owner, politicians can realize substantial
political benefits from such decisions. Policymakers routinely act
directly to favor industrial sectors, thus providing rents to the owners,
managers, and workers whose physical and human capital are
specific to the industry. For example, politicians may be happy to
give protection or subsidies to those whose assets are specific to the
steel industry, and eager to claim direct credit for the resulting rents.
On the other hand, there are reasons why policymakers might
want to avoid making individual decisions about the provision or
protection of rents to private owners. Politicians may face a myriad of
complex and potentially cross-cutting claims, the processing of which
would be prohibitive and the satisfaction of which may, in turn,
inflame other constituents. To return to the steel sector, if each
individual owner, manager, and worker in the steel industry were to
request such benefits independently, policymakers would be
overwhelmed and would face serious problems of determining the
appropriate benefits to assign each individual.
It is easy to imagine circumstances in which the political costs of
processing and responding to such demands would outweigh their
political benefits. Where the transaction costs of dealing with the
claims of owners of specific assets are greater than the net benefits
policymakers may expect from satisfying some of the claimants, we
would expect that politicians would want to avoid making these
12. In some sense these are simply two sides of the same coin–it is the interdependence of
assets that increases the quasi-rents–but they are worth separating for purposes of expositional
clarity.
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decisions. This is analogous to the difficulties of using private bills
for specific benefits to constituents, as has been the case in many
parliamentary democracies, but which has been abandoned almost
everywhere because of excessive cost to politicians in time, energy,
and political capital.
Modern political analysis asserts that the institutions of
policymaking adapt to the needs of the social actors that use them. A
critical example of this is delegation, which is motivated by the idea
that politicians may have reasons to remove themselves from the
direct formulation and implementation of policy. There are many
possible reasons for delegation. These reasons include improving
information gathering, reducing transaction costs, insulating oneself
from political pressure, or avoiding blame. All involve facilitating
politicians’ actions in issue areas that are complex, controversial, or
socially costly.13 And most of them are related to the specificity of
the assets about which policy is being made to their current uses.
In this context, prevailing policies toward the taking of land
represent an extreme form of delegation. In virtually every society,
compensation for taken property is guaranteed and determined by an
agency that is formally independent of the normal political-electoral
process. The logic presented above implies that the very high
transaction costs of processing and responding to these claims
outweigh the political benefits of satisfying claimants of physical
injury to landed property.
The hypothesis presented here, then, is that the universal and
extreme form of delegation used in compensation for takings is a
political-economy response to the great specificity of landed assets.
This specificity makes compensation decisions informationally
complicated, subject to strenuous political lobbying, and potentially
socially very costly. Policymakers have powerful incentives to
delegate these decisions to an independent agency.
13. For a general statement, see Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures
as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. LAW ECON. ORG. 242 (1987). For an empirical
application to British parliamentary politics that focuses on some of these issues, see GARY W.
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Neither asset specificity nor political delegation is unique to land.
Nor is asset specificity the only reason for delegation. However, to
the extent that the argument presented here is correct, there should be
a positive relationship between the specificity of an asset class, or of
the effects of a type of policy on an asset class, and the degree to
which policy is delegated (holding other things constant, of course).
Broad redistributive policies will not be delegated, because their
effects are not specific. But, narrower regulatory, industrial, and trade
policies tend to be delegated more often and delegated more fully.
This in fact seems to accord with casual observation.14 Again, the
countervailing impact of political credit given to the provider of
benefits must be taken into account: a politician who can provide
important targeted benefits to a very small group of asset-holders
may have little reason to delegate the decision. The difficulties arise
where there is so large a population of interested parties that
satisfying their owner-specific demands expeditiously would be
extremely difficult.
I admit that this conjecture is only that–an idea that seems (at least
to me) to be plausible. In its favor is that it is (I think) logically
consistent, in line with current thinking in the political economy of
policymaking, and amenable to being subjected to rigorous empirical
evaluation.
The conjecture could be evaluated by looking at the treatment of
different kinds of assets. It would be interesting to see whether, in
fact, the purported relationship between asset specificity and
delegation holds (ceteris paribus) in other policy realms. It also
would be interesting to see whether the manners in which political
systems handle the valuation of taken property for compensation are
sensitive to the specificity of the property. For example, in the case of
compensation for expropriated foreign investments, we might
investigate whether governments have treated different kinds of
investments differently. Superficially, this seems to be the case as
consideration of what should be done about the expropriation of
creditors is normally handled directly by national governments, while
14. For example, general trade policy is typically made by the legislature and executive,
while such firm-specific complaints, such as “dumping,” are typically delegated to independent
agencies.
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compensation for corporate property is often decided by a (variably)
independent commission. Bonds are, of course, less specific than
foreign corporate property.15 But this is anecdotal; more serious
consideration of the hypothesis seems both feasible and potentially
valuable.
This argument can be used to help us embark on comparative
investigations across political systems. If the political implications of
the treatment of takings are important to their institutional status,
there should be variation in the ways in which the taking of property
is handled that bears a relationship to the features of the political
system – whether parties are disciplined and policies centralized, how
strong the scope is for local special interests.
III. CONCLUSION
The physical taking or impairment of land is treated very
differently from policies that affect the value of other assets. I have
suggested that we search for the reasons for this difference in
characteristics of the assets themselves and how these characteristics
affect the incentives to private actors and policymakers. I have
argued that the great specificity of land to its current use leads to the
great difficulties of arriving at a commonly accepted valuation and
provides powerful incentives for owners to exert political pressure for
favorable treatment. In this context, I propose that politicians have
reasons to remove compensation for land from the political process to
a great extent (full removal is, of course, impossible). Otherwise, they
risk confronting a continuing series of time-consuming and politically
costly, owner-specific political pressures.
Although this is little more than an educated guess, most alternate
explanations are untenable. The efficiency effects of compensation
for land are no different than for many other assets, nor can tradition
simply be invoked to explain away startling national similarities. To
be sure, this hypothesis is little more than a basis for discussion and
analysis. At the very least, I hope to have shown that the issue of
15. I have looked at this from the standpoint of the investing country. See Jeffry Frieden,
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takings should be considered one of political economy, and that the
tools of the political economy trade might be profitably applied to it.
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